


MEMORANDUM FOR: EWP/PW/WL, ~~WL~~ WL

SUBJECT: NIO/SP Memo For D/OSR

*file NIO/SP*

Howard Stoertz has requested that OSR/SEC comment on Paul Nitze's article on "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente" which appears in the January issue of Foreign Affairs.



Date 31 December 1975

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS  
5-75

25X1


SECRET

NO # 2669-75

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030002-4

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505



National Intelligence Officers

SP - 148/75  
30 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Strategic Research

INFORMATION: See Distribution

SUBJECT: Article by Paul Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in  
an Era of Detente" (Foreign Affairs, January 1976)

1. This memorandum contains a request in paragraph 9.
2. Yesterday I called the DCI's particular attention to the attached article. Its importance lies in the stature of its author, in its selection as the lead article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, and in its relevance to SALT and strategic force planning options.
3. Mr. Nitze here registers his belief that a SALT TWO agreement based on the Vladivostok accords, and even a SALT THREE agreement incorporating quantitative reductions from the levels established by SALT TWO, will not preserve the "high-quality deterrence" the US needs. He believes such agreements could instead codify a potentially unstable strategic situation in which the US is moving toward a posture of minimum deterrence, conceding to the Soviets the potential for military and political victory if deterrence fails. He would prefer that the provisions of arms control agreements themselves contribute to rectifying the asymmetries he regards as critical. Failing that, however, he believes it is urgent that the US take positive steps to maintain strategic stability and high-quality deterrence.
4. Mr. Nitze argues that the aims of both deterrence and strategic stability are best served by denying to the Soviets the possibility of attacking US forces with a fraction of their forces under circumstances in which the Soviets could then prevent us from holding their population and industry hostage and in which their unused residual forces would greatly exceed our surviving forces. In his view, the critical asymmetries which give rise to this highly unstable possibility are the active Soviet civil defense program and a growing Soviet superiority in the "throw-weight" of strategic forces.

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030002-4

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030002-4

-2-

SP - 148/75

SUBJECT: Article by Paul Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente" (Foreign Affairs, January 1976)

5. Throw-weight and its significance is a theme Mr. Nitze has been emphasizing for at least the past three years. His article contains charts showing that the total throw-weight of Soviet strategic offensive forces now exceeds and will soon markedly exceed that of US forces. Of greater significance to his argument, the charts show that starting in about 1977 the Soviet advantage in throw-weight after an attack on US forces would be greater than its pre-attack advantage, thus raising the spectre that the USSR could find it "profitable" to launch such an attack.

6. The charts are complicated and Mr. Nitze's explanation of them is, he says, inhibited by security considerations. At first look, the slopes of the curves are fairly consistent with those in NIE 11-3/8-75, but the absolute values for the USSR seem excessive. This appears to be because Mr. Nitze degrades bomber throw-weight by an unspecified penetrability factor, whereas the NIE uses standard bomber loadings. This may represent a weakness in the NIE, though the assignment of a specific degradation factor by Mr. Nitze or anybody else is likely to be quite speculative. A weakness in Mr. Nitze's approach, on the other hand, is the mere lip-service he pays to the question of the absolute level of capability remaining to "the weaker side," i.e., the US. He uses it to argue strongly for new, survivable retaliatory systems--the particular system he favors is a shelter-based land-mobile system--but offers no opinion as to whether the level of US survivors now and in the future is likely to be sufficient with or without such new systems.

7. Mr. Nitze's stress on the importance of Soviet civil defense programs is an element in his argument which is new to me. He believes Soviet civil defense is destabilizing because it could enable the USSR to very sharply reduce its vulnerability to retaliatory attack on urban populations and industrial targets. He quotes Soviet civil defense manuals--a 1969 or 1970 manual, he says, claims that civilian casualties could be held to 3 or 4 percent of population even after a US attack on Soviet cities--but he makes no attempt to evaluate the priorities or effectiveness of Soviet civil defense in actual practice.

8. It is noteworthy that in this article Mr. Nitze does not specifically recommend against concluding a SALT TWO agreement based on the Vladivostok accords. Nor does he place much stress on cruise missiles as a US option. Instead, his emphasis is on improving the counterforce capability and survivability of our missiles, which could be accomplished within SALT agreements on force ceilings, provided that--to accomplish his particular recommendation for survivability--land-mobile ICBMs were not banned. Indeed,

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030002-4

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030002-4


-3-

SP - 148/75

SUBJECT: Article by Paul Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente" (Foreign Affairs, January 1976)

he argues at one point that with SALT TWO ceilings, improved US counterforce capabilities could encourage such Soviet reactions as "going to sea," which would be stabilizing because high-throw-weight ICBMs would be replaced by SLBMs of lesser throw-weight.

9. To assist the DCI to evaluate Mr. Nitze's article, I request that OSR/SEC prepare a commentary on this article. In particular, please comment on the charts and discussion in sections VI and VII of the article, and the discussion of Soviet civil defense. To compare Mr. Nitze's trend-lines and our own, and to serve other probable needs for an understanding of trends, I also request that SEC's charts on static measures, draw-downs, and residuals be re-run on single, twenty-year charts with 1975 in the middle. I am sure we are going to need this, probably sooner rather than later. Is it possible to add a residuals chart which would include the payloads of surviving bombers (i.e., present and postulated future alert force) to supplement the NIE charts which now show only missile warheads?



25X1

Howard Stortz, Jr.  
National Intelligence Officer  
for Strategic Programs

Attachment

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600030002-4

SECRET

SP - 148/75

SUBJECT: Article by Paul Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in  
an Era of Detente" (Foreign Affairs, January 1976)

Distribution:

1 - Addressee  
1 - DCI  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER  
1 - D/DCI/NIO  
1 - DDI  
1 - DDS&T  
1 - D/OWI  
1 - OSR/SEC  
1 - [ ] (c/o NIO/SP)  
1 - NIO/SP  
1 - NIO/RI

25X1

25X1

NIO/SP:HStoertz:[ ](30Dec75)